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Abstract. In this paper, we ask a question whether convolutional neural
networks are more suitable for SCA scenarios than some other machine
learning techniques, and if yes, in what situations. Our results point
that convolutional neural networks indeed outperforms machine learn-
ing in several scenarios when considering accuracy. Still, often there is
no compelling reason to use such a complex technique. In fact, if compar-
ing techniques without extra steps like preprocessing, we see an obvious
advantage for convolutional neural networks only when the level of noise
is small, and the number of measurements and features is high. The
other tested settings show that simpler machine learning techniques, for
a significantly lower computational cost, perform similar or even better.
The experiments with the guessing entropy metric indicate that simpler
methods like Random forest or XGBoost perform better than convolu-
tional neural networks for the datasets we investigated. Finally, we con-
duct a small experiment that opens the question whether convolutional
neural networks are actually the best choice in side-channel analysis con-
text since there seems to be no advantage in preserving the topology of
measurements.
Keywords: Side-channel analysis, Machine learning, Deep learning, Convolu-
tional Neural Networks
1 Introduction
Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a process exploiting physical leakages in order to
extract sensitive information from a cryptographic device. The ability to pro-
tect devices against SCA represents a paramount requirement for the industry.
One especially attractive target for physical attacks is the Internet of Things
(IoT) [1] since 1) the devices to be attacked are widespread and in the proximity
of an attacker and 2) the available resources to implement countermeasures on
devices are scarce. Consequently, we want a setting where the countermeasures
are simple (i.e., cheap) and yet being able to protect from as powerful as possible
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attacks. At the same time, many products have transaction counters which sets
a limit for a number of side-channel measurements we are able to collect.
Profiled side-channel attacks are recognized as the most powerful ones since
they define the worst case security assumptions. There, the attacker has access
to a clone device, which can be profiled for any chosen key. Afterwards, he
can use that knowledge to extract a secret from a different device. Profiled
attacks are conducted in two distinctive phases where the first phase is known
as the profiling (or sometimes learning/training) phase, while the second phase
is known as the attack (test) phase. A well-known example of such an attack
is template attack (TA) [2], a technique that is still the best (optimal) from
an information theoretic point of view if the attacker has unbounded number of
traces and those traces follow Gaussian distribution [3,4]. Soon after the template
attack, the stochastic attack that uses linear regression in the profiling phase
was developed [5]. In coming years, researchers recognized certain weaknesses in
template attack and they tried to modify it in order to better account for different
(usually, more difficult) attack scenarios. One example of such an approach is
the pooled template attack where only one pooled covariance matrix is used in
order to cope with statistical difficulties [6].
Alongside such techniques, SCA community recognized that the same gen-
eral profiled approach is actually used in supervised machine learning. Machine
learning (ML) is a term encompassing a number of methods that can be used
for tasks like clustering, classification, regression, feature selection, etc [7]. Con-
sequently, SCA community started to experiment with different ML techniques
and to evaluate whether they are useful in the SCA context, see e.g., [4, 8–17].
Although considering different scenarios and often different ML techniques (with
some algorithms used in prevailing number of papers like Support Vector Ma-
chines and Random Forest), all those papers have in common that they establish
numerous scenarios where ML techniques can outperform template attack and
are the best choice for profiled SCA.
More recently, deep learning (DL) techniques started to capture attention
of the SCA community. This is quite natural since DL techniques are so suc-
cessful in other domains and there is no reason why similar behavior should
not be observed in the SCA domain. Accordingly, the first results confirmed
that expectations. In 2016, Maghrebi et al. conducted the first analysis of DL
techniques for profiled SCA as well as a comparison against a number of ML
techniques [18]. The results were very encouraging with deep learning surpass-
ing ML and TA. Less than one year later, a paper focusing on Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs) showed impressive results: this technique was better
performing than TA but was also successful against device protected with differ-
ent countermeasures [19]. This, coupled with a fact that the authors were able to
propose several clever data augmentation techniques, boosted even further the
confidence in deep learning for SCA.
In this paper, we take a step back and investigate a number of profiled SCA
scenarios. We compare one deep learning technique that got the most attention in
SCA community up to now – CNNs against several, well-known machine learning
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techniques. Our goal is to examine the strengths of CNNs when compared with
different machine learning techniques and to recognize what are the most suitable
scenarios (considering complexity, explainability, ease of use, etc.) to use deep
learning. We emphasize that the aim of this paper is not to doubt CNNs as a
good approach but to doubt it as the best approach for any profiled SCA setting.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. We conduct a detailed comparison between several machine learning tech-
niques in an effort to recognize situations where convolutional neural net-
works offer clear advantages. We especially note XGBoost algorithm, which
is well-known as an extremely powerful technique but has never before been
used in SCA. We show results for both accuracy and guessing entropy in an
effort to better estimate the behavior of tested algorithms.
2. We design a convolutional neural network architecture that is able to reach
high accuracies and compete with ML techniques as well as with the other
deep learning architecture designed in [18].
3. We conduct an experiment showing that the topology of measurements does
not seem to be the key property for CNNs’ good performance.
4. We discuss scenarios where convolutional neural networks could be preferred
choice when compared with other, simpler machine learning techniques.
2 Background
2.1 Profiled Side-channel Analysis
Let calligraphic letters (X ) denote sets, capital letters (X) denote random vari-
ables taking values in these sets, and the corresponding lowercase letters (x)
denote their realizations. Let k∗ be the fixed secret cryptographic key (byte),
k any possible key hypothesis, and the random variable T the plaintext or ci-
phertext of the cryptographic algorithm, which is uniformly chosen. We denote
the measured leakage as X and consider multivariate leakage X = X1, . . . , XD,
with D being the number of time samples or points-of-interest (i.e., features as
called in ML domain). To guess the secret key, the attacker first needs to choose
a model Y (T, k) depending on the key guess k and on some known text T , which
relates to the deterministic part of the leakage. When there is no ambiguity, we
write Y instead of Y (T, k).
We consider a scenario where a powerful attacker has a device with knowledge
about the secret key implemented and is able to obtain a set of N profiling traces
X1, . . . ,XN in order to estimate the leakage model. Once this phase is done, the
attacker measures additional traces X1, . . . ,XQ from the device under attack
in order to break the unknown secret key k∗. Although it is usually considered
that the attacker has unlimited number of traces available during the profiling
phase, this is of course always bounded.
2.2 Machine Learning Techniques
We select several machine learning techniques to be tested against CNN ap-
proach. More precisely, we select one algorithm based on Bayes theorem (Naive
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Bayes), one tree-based method based on boosting (Extreme Gradient Boosting),
one tree-based method based on bagging (Random forest), and finally, one neural
network algorithm (Multi layered perceptron).
We follow that line of investigation since the “No Free Lunch Theorem” for
supervised machine learning proves there exists no single model that works best
for every problem [20]. To find the best model for any given problem, numerous
algorithms and parameter combinations should be tested. Naturally, not even
then one can be sure that the best model is obtained but at least some estimate
about trade-offs between the speed, accuracy, and complexity of the obtained
models is possible. Besides the “No Free Lunch Theorem” we briefly discuss
two more relevant ML notions. The first one is connected with the curse of
dimensionality [21] and the Hughes effect [22], which states that with a fixed
number of training samples, the predictive power reduces as the dimensionality
increases. This indicates that for scenarios with a large number of features, we
need to use more training examples, which is a natural scenario for deep learning.
Finally, the Universal Approximation theorem states that neural network is a
universal functional approximator, more precisely, even a feed-forward neural
network with a single hidden layer that consists of a finite number of neurons can
approximate many continuous functions [23]. Consequently, by adding hidden
layers and neurons, neural networks gain more approximation power.
Naive Bayes – NB. The Naive Bayes classifier is a method based on the Bayesian
rule. It works under the simplifying assumption that the predictor attributes
(measurements) are mutually independent among the features given the target
class [24]. The existence of highly correlated attributes in a dataset can thus
influence the learning process and reduce the number of successful predictions.
NB assumes a normal distribution for predictor attributes and outputs posterior
probabilities. Naive Bayes does not have any parameters to tune.
Multi Layer Perceptron – MLP. The Multi layer perceptron is a feed-forward
neural network that maps sets of inputs onto sets of appropriate outputs. MLP
consists of multiple layers of nodes in a directed graph, where each layer is fully
connected to the next one. To train the network, the backpropagation algorithm
is used, which is a generalization of the least mean squares algorithm in the
linear perceptron. An MLP consists of three or more layers (since input and
output represent two layers) of nonlinearly-activating nodes [25]. Note, if there
is more than one hidden layer, we can already talk about deep learning.
Extreme Gradient Boost – XGBoost. The XGBoost is a scalable implementation
of gradient boosting decision tree algorithm [26]. Chen and Guestrin designed
this algorithm where they use a sparsity aware algorithm for handling sparse
data and a theoretically justified weighted quantile sketch for approximate learn-
ing [27]. As the name suggests, its core part is gradient boosting (since it uses a
gradient descent algorithm to minimize the loss when adding new models). Here,
boosting is an ensemble technique where new models are added to correct the
errors made by existing models. Models are added sequentially until no further
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improvements can be made. Today, XGBoost is due to his execution speed and
model performance one of the top performing algorithms in the ML domain.
Since this algorithm is based on decision trees, it has additional advantages as
being robust in noisy scenarios and being (somewhat) easier to understand.
Random Forest – RF. The Random forest is a well-known ensemble decision
tree learner [28]. Decision trees choose their splitting attributes from a random
subset of k attributes at each internal node. The best split is taken among
these randomly chosen attributes and the trees are built without pruning, RF
is a parametric algorithm with respect to the number of trees in the forest. RF
is a stochastic algorithm because of its two sources of randomness: bootstrap
sampling and attribute selection at node splitting.
2.3 Convolutional Neural Networks – CNNs
CNNs are a specific type of neural networks which were first designed for 2-
dimensional convolutions as it was inspired by the biological processes of an-
imals’ visual cortex [29]. They are primarily used for image classification but
lately they have proven to be powerful classifiers for time series data such as
music and speech [30]. Their usage in side-channel analysis has been encouraged
by [18, 19]. As we explain in Section 3.2, in order to find the most optimized
model for the available datasets, we use Random Search for hyperparameter
tuning. This enabled us to study how different architectures behaved on the
datasets and compare the results to determine the best candidate model for
our experimental setup. As this work is not attempting to propose a new opti-
mal architecture for side-channel data classification, we used the most optimized
network found through the Random Search for our benchmarks. The final ar-
chitecture was chosen after creating hyperparameter constraints based on the
literature and tests we conducted, followed by an optimization on their values
through a random search. The hyperparameters that are modeled and optimized
are: number of convolutional/pooling/fully connected layers, number of activa-
tion maps, learning rate, dropout magnitude, convolutional activation functions,
convolutional/pooling kernel size, and stride and number of neurons on fully con-
nected layers.
During the training, we use early stopping to further avoid overfitting by
monitoring the loss on the validation set [31]. Thus, every training session is
interrupted before reaching high accuracy on training dataset. To help the net-
work increase its accuracy on the validation set, we use a learning rate scheduler
to decrease the learning rate depending on the loss from the validation set. We
initialize the weights to small random values and we use “adam” optimizer [32].
In this work, we ran the experiment with computation nodes equipped with
32 NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti graphics processing units (GPUs). Each of it has
11 Gigabytes of GPU memory and the 3 584 of GPU cores. Specifically, we
implement the experiment with the Tensorflow [33] computing framework and
Keras deep learning framework [34] to leverage the GPU computation.
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2.4 Performance Analysis
To assess the performance of the classifiers (and consequently the attacker) we
use accuracy: ACC = TP+TNTP+FP+FN+TN .
Besides accuracy, we use also Success rate (SR) and Guessing entropy (GE) [35].
A side-channel adversary AEK ,L conducts experiment ExpAEK,L
, with time-
complexity τ , memory complexity m, and making Q queries to the target imple-
mentation of the cryptographic algorithm. The attack outputs a guessing vector
g of length o, and is considered success if g contains correct key k∗. o is also
known as the order of the success rate. The oth order success rate of the side
channel attack AEK,L is defined as:
SRoAEK,L
(τ,m, k∗) = Pr[ExpAEK,L
= 1]
The Guessing entropy measures the average number of key candidates to
test after the attack. The Guessing entropy of the adversary AEk,L against a key






In this paper, we consider three datasets. One representing an easy target to
attack due to a low level of noise, one more difficult target due to a high level of
noise, and finally, one with random delay countermeasure. For all ML techniques,
we use scikit-learn library in Python 3.6 while for CNNs we use Keras with
TensorFlow backend [33,34].
DPAcontest v2 Dataset [36]. DPAcontest v2 (denoted as DPAv2) provides mea-
surements of an AES hardware implementation. Previous works showed that the
most suitable leakage model (when attacking the last round of an unprotected
hardware implementation) is the register writing in the last round:





Here, Cb1 and Cb2 are two ciphertext bytes and the relation between b1 and
b2 is given through the inverse ShiftRows operation of AES. We select b1 = 12
resulting in b2 = 8 since it is one of the easiest bytes to attack [36]. In Eq. (1),
Y (k∗) consists in 256 values but we apply the Hamming weight (HW) on those
values resulting in 9 classes. Note these measurements are relatively noisy and the
resulting model-based signal-to-noise ratio SNR = var(signal)var(noise) =
var(y(t,k∗))
var(x−y(t,k∗)) ,
lies between 0.0069 and 0.0096. There are several available datasets under the
DPAcontest v2 name, we use here the traces from the “template” set. This
dataset has 3 253 features.
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DPAcontest v4 Dataset [37]. The second dataset we investigate gives measure-
ments of a masked AES software implementation (denoted DPAv4) but since the
mask is known, one can easily transform it into an unprotected scenario. Since
it is a software implementation, the most leaking operation is not the register
writing but the processing of the S-box operation and we attack the first round:
Y (k∗) = Sbox[Pb1 ⊕ k∗]⊕ M︸︷︷︸
known mask
, (2)
where Pb1 is a plaintext byte and we choose b1 = 1. Note that again we 9 classes
scenarios corresponding to the Hamming weight of the output of S-box (as for
DPAcontest v2). Compared to the measurements from the DPAv2, SNR here is
much higher and lies between 0.1188 and 5.8577. For our experiments we start
with a preselected window of 3 000 features from the original trace. Note that
we maintain the lexicographical ordering (topology) of features after the feature
selection (by lexicographical ordering we mean keeping the features in order they
appear in measurements and not for instance sorting them in accordance to their
relevance).
Random Delay Countermeasure Dataset As our last use case, we use a protected
(i.e., with a countermeasure) software implementation of AES. The target smart-
card is an 8-bit Atmel AVR microcontroller. The protection uses random delay
countermeasure as described by Coron and Kizhvatov [38]. Adding random de-
lays to the normal operation of a cryptographic algorithm has as an effect on
the misalignment of important features, which in turns makes the attack more
difficult to conduct. As a result, the overall SNR is reduced (the SNR has a
maximum value of 0.0556). We mounted our attacks in the Hamming weight
power consumption model against the first AES key byte, targeting the first
S-box operation. This dataset has 50 000 traces with 3 500 features each. Note,
this countermeasure has been shown to be prone to deep learning based side-
channel [19]. Random delay is quite often used countermeasure in commercial
products, while not modifying the leakage order (like masking).
3.2 Data Preparation and Parameter Tuning
We denote the training set size as Tr, validation set size as V , and testing set
size as Te. Here, Tr+V +Te equals to the total set size S. We experiment with
four sizes of S – [1 000, 10 000, 50 000, 100 000]5. The ratios for Tr, V , and Te
equal 50% : 25% : 25%. All features are normalized into [0, 1] range.
When using ML techniques, we do not use the validation part but instead we
use 5-fold cross-validation. In the 5-fold cross-validation, the original sample is
first randomly partitioned into 5 equal sized subsets. Then, a single subsample is
selected to validate the data while the remaining 4 subsets are used for training.
The cross-validation process is repeated 5 times where each of the 5 subsamples
5 For the Random delay dataset, we experiment with only the first three sizes since it
has only 50 000 measurements
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is used once for validation. The obtained results are then averaged to produce
an estimation. We select to conduct 5-fold cross-validation on the basis of the
number of measurements belonging to the least populated class for the smallest
dataset we use. Since the number of features is too large for ML techniques, we
conduct feature selection where we take the 50 most important features where
we keep the lexicographical ordering of selected features. We take 50 features for
ML techniques since we use large datasets and the number of features is one of
two factors (the second one being the number of measurements) comprising the
time complexity for ML algorithms. Additionally, 50 features is also taken in the
literature as the design choice [12, 14]. To select those features, we use Pearson
correlation coefficient where we calculate it for the target class variables HW,
which consists of categorical values that are interpreted as numerical values [39]:
Pearson(x, y) =
∑N





For CNNs, we do not conduct cross-validation since it is too computation-
ally expensive but rather additionally use the validation set, that serves as an
indicator of early stopping to avoid overfitting.
In order to find the best hyperparameters, we tune the algorithms with re-
spect to their most important parameters as described below:
1. The Naive Bayes has no parameters to tune.
2. For MLP, we tune the solver parameter that can be either adam, lbfgs, or
sgd. Next, we tune activation function that can be either ReLU or Tanh, and
the number and structure of hidden layers in MLP. The number of hidden
layers is tuned in the range [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] and the number of neurons per layer
in the range [10, 20, 30, 40, 50].
3. For XGBoost, we tune the learning rate and the number of estimators. For
learning rate, we experiment with values [0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1] and for the num-
ber of estimators with values of [100, 200, 400].
4. For Random forest, we tune the number of trees in the range [10, 50, 100, 200, 500],
with no limit to the tree size.
When dealing with convolutional neural networks, in order to find the best fit-
ting model, we optimized 13 hyperparameters: convolutional kernel size, pooling
size, stride on convolutional layer, initial number of filters and neurons, learning
rate, the number of convolutional/pooling/fully connected layers, type of acti-
vation function, optimization algorithm, and dropout on convolutional and fully
connected layers. The hyperparameter optimization was implemented through
a Random Search, where the details on possible parameter ranges are given in
Table 1).
We tune our CNN architecture for the DPAcontest v4 dataset. We use Soft-
max activation function in the classification layer combined with the Categorical
Cross Entropy loss function. For regularization we use dropout on convolutional
and fully connected layers while on the classification layer we use an activity
L2 regularization. These regularization techniques help to avoid overfitting on
the training set, which in turn help lower the bias of the model. The number of
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Table 1: Hyperparameters and their value ranges.
Hyperparameter Value Range Constraints
Convolutional Kernel kconv ∈ [3, 20] -
Pooling Kernel kpool ∈ [3, 20] kpool ≤ kconv
Stride s ∈ [1, 5] in pooling layers, s = kpool − 1
# of Convolutional Layers layersconv ∈ [2, 6] -
# of Pooling Layers layerspool ∈ [1, 5] layerspool ≤ layersconv
# of Fully-connected Layers layersfc ∈ [0, 2] -
Initial # of Activation Maps a ∈ [8, 32] follows geometric progression with
ratio r = 2, for the # of layersconv
Initial # of Neurons n ∈ [128, 1024] follows geometric progression with
ratio r = 2, for the # of layersfc
Convolutional Layer Dropout dropconv ∈ [0.05, 0.10] -
Fully-connected Layer Dropout dropfc ∈ [0.10, 0.20] -




the same for all layers






activation maps increases per layer, following a geometric progression with an
initial value a = 16 and a ratio r = 2 (16, 32, 64, 128). The number of activation
maps is optimized for GPU training. The network is composed of 4 convolutional
layers and 4 pooling layers in between, followed by the classification layer. All
convolutional layers use kernel size of 6 and stride 2 creating a number of activa-
tion maps for each layer. For pooling we use Average Pooling on the first pooling
layer and Max Pooling on the rest, using kernel of size 4 and stride equals 3.
The convolutional layers use “Scaled Exponential Linear Unit” (SELU) activa-
tion function, an activation function which induces self-normalizing properties
and it was first introduced by [40]. We depict our architecture in Figure 1 and
give details about our it in Table 2.
Table 2: Developed CNN architecture.
Layer Output Shape Weight Shape Sub-Sampling Activation
conv(1) 1624 x 16 1 x 16 x 6 2 SELU
average-pool(1) 542 x 16 - (4), 3 -
conv(2) 271 x 32 1 x 32 x 6 2 SELU
max-pool(2) 91 x 32 - (4), 3 -
conv(3) 46 x 64 1 x 64 x 6 2 SELU
max-pool(3) 16 x 64 - (4), 3 -
conv(4) 8 x 128 1 x 128 x 6 2 SELU
max-pool(4) 3 x 128 - (4), 3 -





















Fig. 1: The developed CNN architecture. The simplified figure illustrates the
applied architecture. The yellow rectangular blocks indicate 1-dimensional con-
volution layer, and the blue blocks indicate pooling layers. The first light blue
block indicates average pooling, which is different from the other max pooling
blocks. After the flattening of every trailing spatial dimensions into a single
feature dimension, we apply a fully-connected layer for classification.
4 Results
It has been already established that accuracy is often not sufficient performance
metric in SCA context but something like the key enumeration should be used
to really assess the performance of classifiers [13, 19]. The problem with accu-
racy is most pronounced in imbalanced scenarios since high accuracy can just
mean that the classifier classified all measurements into the dominant class (i.e.,
the one with the most measurements). This phenomenon is well-known in ma-
chine learning community. Since we consider in our experiments the Hamming
weight model, we have imbalanced data where HW class 4 is the most repre-
sented one. In fact, on average HW4 is 70 times more represented than HW0
or HW8. Consequently, a classifier assigning all measurements into HW4 will
have a relatively good accuracy (70/256 ≈ 27.3%) but will not be useful in SCA
context. To denote such cases, we depict the corresponding accuracies in cells
with gray color.
Before presenting results, we briefly address the fact that we do not use tem-
plate attack. The decision for this is based on previous works as listed in Section 1
where it is shown that machine learning and deep learning can outperform TA.




In Table 3, we give results for DPAcontest v4 dataset when considering 50 most
important features. First, we can observe that none of the techniques have prob-
lems with obtaining high accuracy values. In fact, we notice a steady increase
in the accuracy values as we add more measurements into the training/testing
process. By comparing the methods simply by the accuracy score, we see that
XGBoost reaches the highest performance, followed closely by Random forest.
When considering CNN, we see that only Naive Bayes is resulting in smaller
accuracies. Interestingly, when considering 1 000 measurements scenario, we see
that CNN actually has by far the best accuracy. We believe this to be due to a
combination of a small number of measurements and a small number of features.
For larger number of measurements, CNN also needs more features in order to
train a strong model.
Table 3: Testing results, DPAcontest v4, 50 features
Dataset size NB MLP XGBoostRF CNN
1 000 37.6 44.8 52 49.2 60.4
10 000 65.2 81.3 79.7 82.4 77.2
50 000 64.1 86.8 88.8 87.9 81.4
100 000 66.5 91 92.1 90.3 84.5
In Table 4, we present results for DPAcontest v2 with 50 features. As ob-
served in related work (e.g., [13, 18,19]) DPAcontest v2 is a difficult dataset for
profiled attacks. Indeed, we can see that for instance, CNN always assigns all
measurements into class HW4. Additionally, although MLP does not assign all
the measurements into HW4, by examining confusion matrices we see that the
prevailing number of measurements is actually in that class, with only few ones
belonging to HW3 and HW 5. Finally, we see that the best performing technique
is XGBoost where the confusion matrix reveals that even when the accuracy for
XGBoost is similar as assigning all measurements into HW4, the algorithm is ac-
tually able to correctly classify examples of several classes. Since for this dataset
we have the same imbalanced scenario as for DPAcontest v4, we can assume that
the combination of the high noise and imbalancedness represent the problem for
CNN. What is more, our experiments indicate that with this dataset, the more
complex the architecture the easier to assign all classes into HW4. Consequently,
simpler architectures work better as there is not enough expressive power in the
network to learn perfectly the training set. For this reason, the CNN architecture
used in [18] works better for DPAcontest v2 since it is much simpler than the
CNN architecture we use here.
Finally, in Table 5, we five results for the Random delay dataset with 50
features. There, we observe that the accuracies are similar to the case of DPA-
contest v2 but here we do not have such pronounced problems with assigning all
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Table 4: Testing results, DPAcontest v2, 50 features
Dataset size NB MLP XGBoostRF CNN
1 000 14.4 28.8 28.8 25.6 28.8
10 000 10.6 28.3 27.3 25.8 28.2
50 000 12 26.6 26.6 25.3 26.7
100 000 11.7 27.1 27.1 25.8 27.1
measurements into HW4. In fact, we see that behavior in only one case – CNN
with 50 000 measurements.
Table 5: Testing results, Random delay, 50 features
Dataset size NB MLP XGBoostRF CNN
1 000 20 22 27.32 26.8 21.2
10 000 22 26.7 24.9 27 28.2
50 000 25.6 27.6 26.3 26.9 27.1
One could ask why setting the limit to only 50 features. For many machine
learning techniques, the complexity rises drastically with the increase in the
number of features. Coupling that with a large number of measurements and we
soon arrive to a situation where machine learning is simply to slow for practical
evaluations. This is especially pronounced since only a few algorithms have opti-
mized versions (e.g., supporting multi-core and/or GPU computation). For CNN
we do not have such limiting factors. In fact, modern implementations of deep
learning architectures like CNNs enable us to work with thousands of features
and millions of measurements. Consequently, in Table 6, we depict results for all
three considered datasets when using all available features. For DPAcontest v4,
we see improvements in accuracy in all cases, where for cases with more measure-
ments we see drastic improvements. It is especially interesting to consider cases
with 50 000 and 100 000 measurements where we reach more than 95% accuracy.
These results confirm our intuition that CNN needs many features (and not only
many measurements) to reach high accuracies. For DPAcontest v2, we see no
difference when using 50 features or all features. This, although disappointing is
expected: if our architecture was already too complex when using only 50 fea-
tures, adding more features does not make it simpler. Finally, when considering
the Random delay dataset, we see that the accuracies for two smaller dataset
sizes decrease while the accuracy for 50 000 measurements increases where we do
not see that all measurements are assigned to HW4. Again, this is a clear sign
that when working with more complex datasets, having more features helps but
only if it is accompanied with the increase in the number of measurements.
Naturally, a question can be made whether it is really necessary to use DL
for such a small increase in accuracy when compared with much computation-
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1 000 60.8 28.8 20.3
10 000 92.7 22.6 20.2
50 000 97.4 22.3 28
100 000 96.2 27.1 –
ally simpler techniques given in Table ??. Still, we need to note that while for
DL having 100 000 measurements is not considered as a large dataset, we are
approaching the limits for SVM since there the train complexity rises in cube
power with the number of examples. To conclude, based on presented results,
we clearly see cases where CNNs offer advantages over other machine learning
techniques but we note there are cases where the opposite is true.
4.2 Success Rate and Guessing Entropy
Figure 2 gives the guessing entropy of all three datasets and the success rate for
DPAcontest v4 when using 50 000 data samples in total. One can see from Fig. 2a
and 2a that the correct secret key is found for nearly all methods already using
less than 10 traces. Interestingly, we see that the CNN architecture that uses
all the features is less successful than the one using only 50 features, which is
opposite from the results on the basis of accuracy. The most efficient techniques
are MLP and XGBoost, but for this scenario we see that even a simple method
like Naive Bayes is more than enough. For DPAcontest v2 we see that NB is
performing more efficient than all other methods. This could be due to a fact
that other methods are more prone to classify most of the measurements into
HW class 4 and thus do not contribute significant information to recover the
secret key. For the Random delay dataset we observe that NB, XGBoost, and
RF are the most efficient methods.
5 Discussion and Future Work
We start this section with a small experiment. Consider for example the DPAv4
dataset with all features and 10 000 measurements. Note that the measurements
are given in a form to keep the original topology (ordering of features) as much
as possible. One reason why CNNs are so successful in image classification is be-
cause they are able to maintain the topology, i.e., shuffling features in an image
would results in a wrong classification. We do exactly that: we shuffle the features
uniformly at random. Running our CNN architecture on such a dataset results in
test accuracy of 91.2%, which is only 1.5% worse than with unshuffled features.
If we run the same experiment for DPAcontest v2 and Random delay, we see no
change or even an increase of 2.7% in accuracy, respectively. Consequently, we
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(a) DPAv4 (b) DPAv4
(c) DPAv2 (d) Random delay
Fig. 2: Side-channel metrics, 50 000 dataset
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observe that the ordering of features does not negatively influence the success-
fulness of CNNs in SCA domain. This suggests that the topology preservation
of CNNs is maybe not needed for SCA, which would mean we should not keep
our focus solely on CNNs but to consider other deep learning techniques as well.
These observations are also in accordance with results obtained with MLP in [42]
Naturally, CNNs also have the implicit feature selection part. It is possible that
current good results on SCA stem from that, which would in turn mean we could
use separate feature selection and classification to the same goal.
When considering deep learning architectures, and more specifically their
sizes, a valid question is whether the architectures currently used in SCA are
really deep. For instance, Cagli et al. mention their architecture as being “quite
deep CNN architecture” but if we compare that with the state-of-the-art CNNs
architectures used today, we see striking difference. The current “best” archi-
tecture for image classification called ResNet has 152 hidden layers [43]. Our
architectures look very shallow compared to that. Naturally, the question is if
we even need such deep architectures, and if the answer is no, then maybe com-
putationally simpler machine learning techniques could be a good alternative.
We do not need to investigate only the deep learning part. As Cagli et al.
showed, using smart preprocessing (e.g., data augmentation) can bring more
striking increase in the performance than by changing the network architec-
ture [19]. Machine learning domain is extensively using various data augmenta-
tion techniques for years and there is no reason why some of those, more general
methods could not be used in SCA. Additionally, we must mention that data
augmentation is not limited to deep learning and it would be interesting to see
what would happen if SCA-specific data augmentation would be used with other,
simpler machine learning techniques.
Finally, in this paper we do not consider masked implementations, which
could be the case where convolutional neural networks outperform other tech-
niques. Still, when considering the related work it is not so clear whether this is
a trait of CNNs or simply deep architectures [19,42].
When discussing the results on a more general level, we can observe some
trends.
1. The number of measurements and number of features are connected and
that simply increasing one quantity without the other does not guarantee an
improvement in performance.
2. The level of noise in conjunction with highly imbalanced data seem to affect
CNN more than some simpler machine learning techniques. Naturally, to
reduce the level of noise, it is possible to use various forms of preprocessing
and to reduce the imbalancedness, a simple solution is to undersample the
most represented classes. This could be problematic in scenarios where we
require a large number of measurements (but are for instance limited in
the amount we can acquire) since undersampling will drastically reduce the
number of measurements we have at our disposal.
3. As a measure of performance in all algorithms, we use accuracy. When com-
paring the performance on the basis of accuracy vs guessing entropy, we can
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see there are differences and cases when accuracy cannot be used as a defini-
tive measure of performance. Still, our results do not indicate that any of
tested algorithms is less sensitive to this problem.
4. CNNs are more difficult to train and have more parameters than some other
(simpler) machine learning techniques. This makes it a challenging decision
whether it is beneficial to invest more resources into tuning for a probably
small improvement in the performance.
5. We see that one trained CNN architecture for a specific dataset is suboptimal
on some other dataset. This indicates that the obtained models are not easily
transferable across scenarios, which even more raises the concern about the
computational costs vs. potential performance gains.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider a number of scenarios for profiled SCA and we com-
pare the performance of several machine learning algorithms. Recently, very
good results obtained with convolutional neural networks suggested them to be
a method of choice when conducting profiled SCA. Our results show that CNNs
are able to perform very well but the same could be said for other machine learn-
ing techniques. We see a direct advantage for CNN architectures over machine
learning techniques only for cases where the level of noise is low, the number of
measurements is large, and the number of features is high. In other cases, our
findings suggest that machine learning is able to perform on a similar level (with
much smaller computational cost) or even surpass CNNs. When considering the
guessing entropy metric, the results favor methods like Random forest and XG-
Boost, which is a clear indication more experiments are needed to properly assess
the strengths of convolutional neural networks. As discussed in previous sections,
there are many possible research directions one could follow, which will in the
end bring more cohesion to the area and more confidence in the obtained results.
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